

The Education of Nations... in Securing Peace and Avoiding War

January 2020 onwards

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OPEN LETTER

Dr John Chipman,
Director-General and Chief Executive,
The International Institute for Strategic Studies ('IISS'),
Arundel House,
6 Temple Place,
London WC2R 2PG

27 January 2021.

Dear Sir,

Re: Russia's Military Modernisation: An Assessment (IISS, September 2020)

One year ago today I published an indictment of Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman's book The Future of War: A History¹ for deliberately (or through wilful ignorance) omitting work of mine from the early 1990s² that was obviously relevant to, and contradicted, his conclusions.³ Whereas Professor Freedman was only giving us the benefit of his political opinions, plainly deficient in educational terms, your IISS title above is published as an educational charity. You were copied into my indictment so have chosen to ignore or defy the warnings given therein.

In view of the lack of any serious regulation of this sector,⁴ I have had to take on the role of *de facto* Law Officer for Public Benefit ('Law PB') based on the case concerning the Project on Demilitarisation ('Prodem'), which I lost but won decisively on the only relevant legal principle in dispute: the general desirability of peace rather than war.⁵ Based on the expert legal framework provided by Mr Justice Carnwath, one of the foremost judges of our time, and the facts contained in Russia's Military Modernisation ('IISS Strategic Dossier'),⁶ I find that:

- (i.) You have usurped the authority of the IISS Trustees, with or without their consent;
- (ii.) This IISS dossier does not meet the legal standard set out in the Prodem case;
- (iii.) Furthermore, it helps to create a climate for war which, for a charity, is *unlawful*.

After carefully reading my case below, I invite you to consider your position. For if you do not, of your own volition, resign forthwith and permanently from all positions at IISS (except honorary ones), then any future letter from Law PB would be directed to the Chair of Trustees.

My Purpose:

To forewarn the public one more time that the world is heading for another Great Power war.

As in 1920, the reason is the failure of political institutions to apply 'an irenic perspective' even-handedly. Post-Cold War, the term was first defined in English charity law on 9 October 1998, drawing on a United States case of 1917, and affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 28 June 2000.

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1. The Facts

The opening paragraph of the Introduction to this IISS Strategic Dossier states:

In the Western popular imagination at least, the United States and its allies emerged victorious in the Cold War against the communist Soviet Union. Russia did experience severe economic and political turbulence in the immediate post-Soviet era, but Moscow did not necessarily see itself as having been defeated. Rather, the Russian political elite's view is increasingly that the country was betrayed by those in the West who had assured that Russia would benefit from free-market economics, but instead expanded the reach of an alliance (NATO) that had been established with the single purpose of containing Moscow, while the new economy concentrated wealth in the hands of a few. Analysis of the misunderstandings and the missed opportunities of the late 1980s and early 1990s falls outside the scope of this study, but Moscow's view of these events continues to influence and shape its security policies and its armed forces, the capabilities of which were degraded severely by the turmoil of the 1990s.

This IISS Strategic Dossier examines how Russia's armed forces have fared in the three decades since the end of the Soviet Union.... *the conclusions of this publication are also valuable when considering the nature and extent of any challenge that Moscow's more capable armed forces pose to European security.*⁷ [Emphasis added.]

Notwithstanding the omission of 'the misunderstandings and the missed opportunities', there is a brief resume in the next sub-section entitled '**Soviet no more**' of the circumstances '... along which the US-Russia relationship fractured.' This leads to the following comparison:

Having extracted the Soviet Union from a protracted war in Afghanistan, [the Soviet leader] *Gorbachev said, idealistically, in 1989 that 'the use of force... has become historically obsolete'*. Three decades later, Russia had annexed foreign territory, fought wars with former parts of the USSR and embarked on a successful expeditionary operation to support the Syrian regime in a civil war.

Far from being 'historically obsolete', by 2018 President Vladimir Putin was lauding the armed forces and telling the Federal Assembly that Russia possesses a 'modern high-technology army'...

Examining the extent to which Putin's boast of 'a modern high-technology army' is justified is a founding question of this dossier. Nevertheless, *without Putin and his political associates, it is at the very least debatable whether Russia's armed forces would have recovered to the extent they have from the vicissitudes of the 1990s.*⁸ [Emphasis added.]

The copyright page of this Dossier makes clear that it was prepared by you as Director-General and Chief Executive of IISS and your staff with expert assistance and review but 'The responsibility for the contents is ours alone.' IISS independence of any governments or any political or other organisation is underlined while stressing '*rigorous research with a forward-looking policy orientation that can improve wider public understanding of international security problems and influence the development of sounder public policy.*'⁹ [Emphasis added.]

2. Findings Based on Material Facts

(i) *The Authority of the IISS Trustees*

IISS is registered charity no. 206504. Its Trustees 'are the people responsible for controlling the work, management and administration of the charity on behalf of its beneficiaries.'¹⁰ Yet I could find no reference to the IISS Trustees in your Strategic Dossier nor even that 'The International Institute for Strategic Studies' is a registered charity (nor was its number cited).

Law PB finds that you have usurped the authority of the IISS Trustees but cannot determine from the IISS Strategic Dossier whether this has been done with or without their consent.

(ii) *The Legal Standard to be met by the IISS Strategic Dossier*

In July 1998 and, on appeal, in March 2000 I voluntarily subjected my four Prodem Briefings, with all six included, to the most exhaustive legal analysis ever undertaken in the English courts of the study of the issues of peace and war. A standard far more rigorous than any peer-reviewed political science journal, then or now, was applied.¹¹ I now apply, as Law PB, that same standard to the IISS Strategic Dossier by adopting the same approach that Lord Justice Chadwick took ('Chadwick LJ'), as the lead of three judges, by comparing his findings on the Prodem Briefings with mine on your Strategic Dossier.

I do not dispute the correctness of his factual summary except on one material point: after judgment was handed down on 28 June 2000, this Appeal Court judge was confronted in writing with the evidence that the three judges had, apparently deliberately, falsified this fact. I said that, if so, I would leave everything to the 'Court of history'.¹² He did not dispute it, but it undermines his Conclusion that 'Prodem's object is to educate the public to an acceptance that peace is best secured by "demilitarisation"'. I have no reason to doubt Dr Southwood's sincerity when he protests to the contrary; but the evidence is firmly against him.¹³

The Prodem Briefings (1993-94)

Chadwick LJ quoted or summarised the statement of purpose and conclusions of each Prodem Briefing, while it was in process of formation, but not my Briefing A/3 which was published in October 1995 after the Trust Deed was executed in 1994.¹⁴ Its significance is explained later.

He came to these findings. You are encouraged to read them straight through before reading Law PB's factual interspersions on what was omitted as being relevant to public benefit:

The passages in the briefing papers which I have set out provide only a flavour – but, I think, a representative flavour – of their contents. To my mind it is impossible to read the briefing papers – as I have done – without reaching the conclusion that what the first trustees (Dr Schofield and Dr Southwood) had in mind when they executed the declaration of trust in June 1994 was that the 'education' of the public should be advanced by the dissemination of their own views in relation to the evils of militarism, the need for disarmament, and the curtailment of the role of NATO and of the support of the United Kingdom for collective military security through an alliance of that nature.¹⁵

Carnwath J had accepted, from the United States case of Parkhurst v Burrill (1917), ‘the premise that people should be educated as to the “evil effects” of war’. In that case, the World Peace Foundation did ‘cultivate a belief in the waste of warlike preparation, and in the practical wisdom for reductions of the armaments of nations...’¹⁶ Moreover the role of NATO was being curtailed in the early 1990s in terms of reduced defence spending (albeit in a one-sided way compared to the former Warsaw Pact which disbanded) and Prodem adopted no position on whether the UK should or should not continue as a member.¹⁷ In addition the use of the term ‘Editors’ to describe the first trustees plainly implies that the Briefings would not just be used to disseminate their own views. Chadwick LJ continued:

That is not to denigrate those views; nor to suggest that they are not sincerely held and defensible. But it is to recognise – as it seems to me it must be recognised when the papers are read (as they are intended to be read)¹⁸ as a sequential whole – that the purpose of the authors was to advocate alternative policies to achieve disarmament and a conversion of resources from military to civilian purposes.¹⁹

Carnwath J had made clear, though, as the charity regulators had not, that ‘there is no reason to exclude, from the scope of charity, education as to the benefits of peace, and as to peaceful methods of resolving international disputes.’²⁰

Chadwick LJ had shifted the emphasis back to Prodem’s Aim 2, ‘To propose alternative policies to achieve disarmament and a conversion of resources from military to civil purposes’, after my successful defence of Aim 1, ‘To fundamentally question the new forms of militarism arising in the West in relation to: its recent record; current official policies; the likely consequences for the future’, which Carnwath J had held to be a political purpose. He had relied on dictionary definitions supplied by the Attorney General, but I was able to demonstrate in the Appeal Court that my own Concise Oxford Dictionary-based definition²¹ had been applied consistently not tendentiously. Chadwick LJ did not refute that defence:

Their advocacy of those policies was to be directed towards the audiences identified in the background paper prepared in October 1992 – pressure groups, politicians, journalists and decision makers.²²

These are the audiences who would be the potential purchasers of the Briefings whether their purpose was educational or political.

It is, I think, beyond argument that the aim of the PRODEM initiative was to bring about a change in the policy of the United Kingdom government – and, perhaps, other Western governments – in relation to disarmament and the role of NATO.²³

Despite this emphatic finding, the three judges went on to provide a legal path by which changes of policy might indeed come about – as the US judge in the Parkhurst v Burrill case had recognised – by ‘the general diffusion of intelligence upon the subjects taught...’²⁴ and which I had foreseen in the final Briefing A/3 before the Prodem court case began. Their own finding was itself undermined by the Appeal judges’ claim that there were two general editors of Prodem Briefing No. 1 when the evidence clearly showed that I alone edited it.²⁵

I now apply the same standard and reasoning to your Dossier and invite your legal defence.

The IISS Strategic Dossier (2020)

I respectfully submit, as Law PB, that:

To my mind it is impossible to read the Strategic Dossier – as I have done – without reaching the conclusion that what you and your staff had in mind when you prepared and published it on behalf of the Trustees of IISS, a charitable company registered since 22 September 1962, was to ‘promote the resolution of conflicts between or within nations’²⁶ by the dissemination of your views in relation to the benefits of militarism, the need for rearmament, and the expansion of the role of NATO and of support of the United Kingdom for collective military security through an alliance of that nature. That is not to denigrate those views; nor to suggest that they are not sincerely held and defensible. But it is to recognise – as it seems to me it must be recognised when the Dossier is read (as it is intended to be read) as a sequential whole – that the purpose of the authors was to advocate ‘sounder public policy’ to achieve rearmament and a conversion of resources from civilian to military purposes to meet ‘any challenge that Moscow’s more capable armed forces pose to European security’. Their advocacy of those policies was to be directed towards the audiences that can ‘influence the development of sounder public policy’ – pressure groups, politicians, journalists and decision makers.²⁷ It is, I think, beyond argument that the aim of Russia’s Military Modernisation was to bring about a change in, or reinforcement of, the policy of the United Kingdom government – and other Western governments – in relation to rearmament and the role of NATO versus ‘[Russian President] Putin’s boast of “a modern high technology army”.’

If you, or the IISS legal representatives, consider that there are factual interspersions which should be made, as I have done with Chadwick LJ’s findings, you are invited to offer them.

There is also the question of whether IISS as a charity can justify the following omissions, highlighted in italics on page 2 above, in the passages taken from the IISS Strategic Dossier:

- The notion that the West ‘won’ the Cold War was not a work of ‘imagination’, as you are aware, but popularised by an article of Francis Fukuyama who later turned it into a book that I analysed extensively in Prodem Briefing A/3.²⁸ In irenic terms, who won the Cold War is highly relevant to the ‘founding question’ of, and conclusions to, the IISS Dossier.
- My four Prodem Briefings, relying partly on IISS data, analysed extensively the balance of peaceful methods of conflict resolution in the late 1980s/early 1990s.²⁹ Your omission of such ‘misunderstandings and the missed opportunities’ is academically indefensible, especially as they are written into the defining legal case relevant to IISS activities. Even more so, as my work had a ‘forward looking... orientation’ and pre-dated Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 1999-2000 so it cannot be put down to being simply ‘Moscow’s view’.
- Gorbachev’s view on ‘the use of force’, made in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 7 December 1988, quoted in Prodem Briefing No. 1, is contrasted with what has happened since under President Putin. The IISS Dossier explanation makes no connection between the one-sided peace process of the 1990s and how this changed the climate of opinion in Russia and gave rise to a nationalist government (as foreseen in Briefing A/3).³⁰

3. Findings Based on Relevant Law

The previous reference to a 'climate of opinion' brings us to the relevant law, derived from the Prodem case, to be applied to the IISS Strategic Dossier. This term must be understood, as Carnwath J did, in relation to case law [as at 1998] on '**War and Peace**'.

The salient points are:

- 'Trusts directed to promoting the security of the nation by military means have generally been held to be charitable...'³¹
- 'Perhaps surprisingly, the promotion of national security by peaceful means has proved a more controversial subject...'³²
- 'More specifically, trusts for the promotion of international co-operation and understanding have been held not to be charitable...'³³

However, drawing on the US authorities, the judge concluded on an 'irenic perspective':

I see nothing controversial in the proposition that a purpose may be educational, even though it starts from the premise that [A] peace is preferable to war, and [B] puts consequent emphasis on peaceful, rather than military, techniques for resolving international disputes; and even though [C] one purpose of the education is to 'create a public sentiment' in favour of peace... The desirability of peace as a general objective is not [a matter of political controversy].³⁴

Note the irrefutable logic: [A] leads to [B] and results in [C]. It is an objective test of whether events relating to an international dispute are moving towards a climate for peace or war.

This must be consistent with the principle subsequently highlighted by Chadwick LJ [in 2000]:

... the court cannot determine (and should not attempt to determine) whether policies adopted by the government of the United Kingdom and other Western governments are or are not for the public benefit.³⁵

Moreover, the trial judge had acknowledged that, in principle, the framework for a future Briefing series outlined in Appendix E of Prodem Briefing A/3 was educational.³⁶ It explained:

The focus would be on Series A/4 as this alone provides the foundation for the challenge to realism and Great Power politics... The main text would consist of two contrasting analyses, one person offering a common security perspective and another a realist military security perspective. If the analysts were to be of similar ability, then over time and across regions it may become evident which analytical approach is proving superior in terms of foreseeing the dangers of military adventurism and proposing a path to peace...

In short, the reader could decide whether the military aspects of security are being emphasised out of all proportion to the non-military and thus to the detriment of security as a whole...³⁷

That is why Chadwick LJ trusted that 'Dr Southwood... will forgive me...'; provided the precise wording of the objects clause of what became IPP²⁰⁰⁰; and thereby enabled this competition.³⁸

(iii) *Creating a Climate for War*

The charitable objects of IISS, as set out in its Memorandum and Articles of Association incorporated on 20 November 1958 (as amended), are given in the register of charities:

- A) To promote on a non-party basis the study and discussion of and the exchange of information upon any major international security issues including without limitation those of a political, strategic, economic, social or ecological nature
- B) To promote conflict resolution by facilitating discussion & dialogue & publishing analysis on major international security issues to assist & promote the resolution of conflicts between or within nations.³⁹

The 'Activities' of IISS stated in the register underline this international perspective though with an explicit reference to 'military' developments missing from the above objects, but implicit in the terms 'security', 'political' and 'conflict resolution'. However, the section adds:

[The IISS] mission is to promote the adoption of sound policies to further global peace and security and maintain civilised international relations.⁴⁰

Whereas I can see nothing in objects A and B of a non-charitable nature, this latter statement begs the question of how 'sound policies' are to be determined? The IISS objects fall principally under the description of purposes relating to the advancement of education, conflict resolution and the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown but must also meet the public benefit requirement.⁴¹ The reference to 'global peace and security' and the ambiguous phrase 'civilised international relations' suggest, but do not bind IISS to, the adoption of an 'irenic perspective', as in the Prodem case.

However, what neither the IISS objects nor its mission permit is a breach of political neutrality, e.g. by such phrases as '... any challenge that Moscow's more capable armed forces pose to European security...' when Russia is plainly partly in Europe; or 'without Putin and his political associates'.⁴² More seriously, my findings on page 5 above, demonstrate that despite the independence of IISS, the public benefit of your Strategic Dossier cannot be determined.

Law PB submits that by leaving out material in my four Prodem Briefings on NATO-Russian relations in the early 1990s, which demonstrated a 'forward-looking... orientation' relevant to the IISS Strategic Dossier and vindicated by subsequent events, while also ignoring the Prodem legal case, the Dossier is helping to create a climate for war. This is plainly and unarguably outside the charitable objects of IISS, being a political purpose, and thus *unlawful*.

Conclusion

Your IISS military database is an invaluable resource which is undoubtedly for the public benefit. The sole question is over how it was applied or, in this case, misapplied. All honour and respect are due to you and your staff for your expertise and sincerity. But 'the factual truth, the whole factual truth and nothing but the factual truth' is the foundation for academic freedom under the law to question received wisdom. I invite you to take responsibility for the failure to meet that standard here, and the IISS Trustees for initiating a thorough-going reform of IISS processes and standards to bring them into line with the Prodem legal case.

Your Dossier's own Conclusion underlines the seriousness of the situation, starting with this seemingly self-contradictory assertion:

... As of 2020, Russia is a capable *continental* military power, with *intercontinental-range* nuclear weapons. To its west it sees an enlarged NATO as a 'threat'... Moscow entered this century with conventional armed forces incapable of carrying out important defence tasks required by the state and *was therefore overly reliant on nuclear forces*. Two decades on, following almost 15 years of sustained investment, Russia now has conventional military forces more commensurate with its defence and security goals.

... What this modernisation process has not delivered is a force of the capability and scale to match the United States and NATO in *a sustained all-out conventional war*, but this was likely never the aim. Rather, Moscow now has armed forces that provide it with the ability to rapidly mount a sizeable operation *where it would have conventional superiority for a limited period*. In a European context, the challenge to NATO would instead be maintaining alliance cohesion and managing risk of escalation.⁴³ [Emphasis added.]

If you read my Prodem Briefing A/1 entitled NATO's Military Supremacy: What Is It For?, which was published 27 years before your Dossier, you will find most points made therein. Your Dossier claims '... the arc of Soviet and Russian military development has on occasion caught Western analysts by surprise...'⁴⁴ Not readers of this and my other Prodem Briefings, I trust.

Yet surely the most important conclusion from A/1 (September 1993) and your Dossier (September 2020) is that precisely because of Russia's weakened state the risk of a conventional conflict, in or near its own territory, escalating to the strategic nuclear level has greatly increased since the Soviet era.

Be aware, therefore, that if IISS and the wider political science community continue to ignore my Prodem Briefings – without excuse or justification – my indictment of the IISS Strategic Dossier will not end here. I have seen the future more clearly than any other expert I know of in our time and proven it before the English courts. I have not had a sycophantic relationship with governments of any hue. My duty as Law PB will not allow me to remain silent while nations are led like Jews to the slaughter – not deliberately, but through a fundamental and wilful failure to understand, and to test, how the processes of international relations lead to a state of war or peace independently of the policies and wills of the parties in dispute.

Yours faithfully,



Peter M. Southwood
Law Officer for Public Benefit in England and Wales
(*de facto* but not yet *de jure*)

A signed original of this letter will be posted to the IISS Director-General on 27 January 2021. A copy will then be uploaded to my website at: www.directionofconflict.org

Distribution

This letter can be copied to those who are or may be interested provided it is done in full, without amendment or financial charge. The letter may also be quoted with due acknowledgement.

Privacy Notice

Copies of this letter, which are posted to named individuals or officials, are sent because I have a legitimate interest in the matters raised therein.

Otherwise, the database used for the circulation of this letter is entirely impersonal, i.e. it has no named persons but only postholders in various institutions.

References

- ¹ . Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (Penguin Books, 2018).
- ² . Peter Southwood, General Editor and Editor Series A, Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem): The Triumph of Unilateralism: The Failure of Western Militarism, Briefing No. 1 (Prodem, March 1993), 69pp ISBN 1-898079-00-5; NATO's Military Supremacy: What is It For? Briefing A/1 (Prodem, September 1993), 44pp ISBN 1-898079-10-2; Western Generals: The Dangers from British and American Military Success, Briefing A/2 (Prodem, School of Business and Economic Studies, University of Leeds, April 1994), 53pp ISBN 1-898079-20-X; Military Adventurism: Learning From the Past – Looking to the Future, Briefing A/3 (SBES, University of Leeds, October 1995), 79pp ISBN 1-898079-25-0. All available through Legal Deposit libraries in the UK and Ireland. (Details of the Series B and C Prodem Briefings, edited by Steve Schofield, are omitted here but available on the back cover of the Series A Briefings.)
- ³ . Peter M. Southwood, The Education of Nations: An Indictment, Closing Bulletin No. 3 (of 3), The Paris Peace Conference 1919 Remembered... 100 Years on (27 January 2020). Available at: [Closing Bulletins & Article — Peace or War \(directionofconflict.org\)](https://directionofconflict.org/closing-bulletins/article-peace-or-war/)
- ⁴ . See Peter M. Southwood's letters, articles and closing bulletins of 'The Paris Peace Conference 1919 Remembered', especially Articles no. 1 and 2, and 'The Education of Nations' bulletins, particularly the indictment of the English charity regulators on 10 April and 11 September 2020 available at: [Peace or War \(directionofconflict.org\)](https://directionofconflict.org/peace-or-war/)
- ⁵ . For copies of the Prodem judgments, see: <http://www.ipp2000.org/ipplaw.html> For an analysis of these judgments, see Peter M. Southwood, 'A Bleak House Today: How English Charity Regulators Missed the Mark in 2000 and Beyond', Article no. 2 (6 March 2019) at <https://www.directionofconflict.org/what-we-do>
- ⁶ . Russia's Military Modernisation: An Assessment, an IISS strategic dossier (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September 2020).
- ⁷ . Ibid, p. 7.
- ⁸ . Ibid, pp. 7-9. Emphasis in the original.
- ⁹ . Ibid, p. 2.
- ¹⁰ . Charity Commission description in the register. IISS entry downloaded on 15 October 2020 - see note 39.
- ¹¹ . In fact, to the best of his knowledge or belief, Law PB claims that no suitable peer-reviewed journal for the application of research findings on peace or war currently exists anywhere in the English-speaking world.
- ¹² . Letter from P.M. Southwood to the Clerk to Lord Justice Chadwick dated 29 June 2000, containing the evidence to show that he alone had edited Prodem Briefing No. 1, and the reply from the Judge's Clerk dated 3 July 2000 stating 'The Judge regrets that the amendment to paragraph 11, made in response to your list of suggested corrections to the draft judgment, has failed to meet your concern...' This list contained obvious factual errors and typing corrections.
- ¹³ . Southwood & Parsons v H M Attorney General, Re: Project on Demilitarisation ('Prodem'), Court of Appeal No: CHANF 98/1405/CMS3 [28 June 2000], para. 30.
- ¹⁴ . This was a point of legal difference between the High Court and Court of Appeal, not dealt with here, involving the 'probative value' of Briefing A/3 for ascertaining whether the main purpose for which Prodem was formed was charitable or non-charitable.

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- ¹⁵ . Southwood & Parsons v HMAG [28 June 2000], para. 16.
- ¹⁶ . Parkhurst v Burrill [1917] 117 NE 39 in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
- ¹⁷ . See, for example, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), pp. 36-7. The question is not membership or non-membership of NATO in itself but its capacity to achieve peaceful relations between former enemies while expanding the Alliance eastwards excluding Russia.
- ¹⁸ . It was intended that the briefings should be read as a sequential whole, when Southwood drafted the original background paper out of the funding bid, but inevitably differences of view emerged when his colleague took over as Editor of Series B and C.
- ¹⁹ . Southwood & Parsons v HMAG [28 June 2000], para. 16.
- ²⁰ . Southwood & Parsons v HMAG [9 October 1998], para 22. Emphasis in the original.
- ²¹ . The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 7th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1984) refers to: ‘... undue prevalence of military spirit or ideals’ which I adapted to read ‘an undue prevalence of warlike values and ideas’ as contained in the Prodem Background paper (October 1992). This was done to emphasise that Prodem was not anti-military or pacifist.
- ²² . Southwood & Parsons v HMAG [28 June 2000], para. 16.
- ²³ . *Ibid.*
- ²⁴ . Chief Justice Rugg in Parkhurst v Burrill [1917].
- ²⁵ . See note 12 above.
- ²⁶ . See page 7 and note 39 below, where the IISS objects are cited.
- ²⁷ . An example of the use made by the IISS Strategic Dossier is an article entitled ‘Putin’s New Model Army’ in The Economist (7-13 November 2020), pp. 32-3. It provides virtually no historical context as to how the current situation arose. The article concludes: ‘[NATO] has underestimated how Russia’s new firepower may be used in a shorter, sharper and more expansive war that would stretch far beyond the Baltics. Its planners, and the national politicians that set military budgets and priorities, need to adjust their strategies and spending in the light of these new threats.’
- ²⁸ . Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin Books, 1992) based on an article by him published in The National Interest in the summer of 1989.
- ²⁹ . See Prodem Briefing No. 1 (March 1993) and Briefing A/1 (September 1993) detailed in note 2 above.
- ³⁰ . See Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), esp. the Conclusion, pp. 43-4.
- ³¹ . Southwood & Parsons v HMAG [9 October 1998], para. 18.
- ³² . *Ibid.*, para. 19.
- ³³ . *Ibid.*, paras 20-21.
- ³⁴ . *Ibid.*, para. 26.
- ³⁵ . Southwood & Parsons v HMAG [28 June 2000], para. 24.
- ³⁶ . Southwood & Parsons v HMAG [9 October 1998], para. 31.
- ³⁷ . Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), p.78-9.
- ³⁸ . Southwood & Parsons v HMAG [28 June 2000], para. 28; and compare paras 29 with 30 in relation to the proposition that ‘it promotes public benefit for the public to be educated in the differing means of securing a state of peace and avoiding a state of war’; so as to give effect to the trial judge’s approval in principle of what came to be called the ‘Peace Games’ concept in Prodem Briefing A/3, Appendix E. The wording from paras 29 and 30 provided the objects clause of what became the International Peace Project²⁰⁰⁰ (IPP) to continue almost unchanged the aims of the Prodem Background paper but with the legal framework now clarified and affirmed.
- ³⁹ . The online register of English and Welsh charities was accessed on 15 October 2020 at: [Search the charity register - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/search-charity-register) . Its accuracy is dependent on the IISS Trustees ensuring that their entry for charity reg. no. 206504 is kept up to date. Law PB has not seen the company registration documents.
- ⁴⁰ . *Ibid.*
- ⁴¹ . Charities Act 2011, Part 1, sections 1-4.
- ⁴² . This terminology is reminiscent of that used by gangster families of each other, e.g. in ‘The Godfather’ film (1972) directed by Francis Ford Coppola. It is unflattering of IISS itself and wholly inappropriate for a charity to join in with the general political opprobrium orchestrated by governments against their opponents or enemies.
- ⁴³ . Russia’s Military Modernisation p. 179.
- ⁴⁴ . For Prodem Briefing A/1 see note 2 above; and Russia’s Military Modernisation, p.182.